Fourth Appellate Psyches Out the WCAB By Robert Warne - October 31, 2003 The Fourth District Court of Appeal in California issued an opinion on the six-month employment rule that applies to psyche claims, Oct. 30.
The case Wal-Mart v. WCAB resolved a standing dispute over the interpretation of Labor Code Section 3208.3 and how it applies to psyche claims resulting from a physical injury.
Velta Elaine Garcia had worked for Wal-Mart less than six-months in 1995 when she injured her back and had to undergo surgery. She never returned to her job after the accident.
Four years after the injury, Garcia amended her work comp claim to include a psyche claim associated with her back injury.
The workers’ compensation judge handling the matter denied her claim based on the six-month rule. But the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board ruled that the 3208.3 six-month statute didn’t apply to Garcia and remanded the case for further proceedings.
After reviewing the case the Fourth Appellate Court determined that the original workers’ compensation judge’s decision was appropriate.
Referring to Lockheed Martin, supra, the court said the only exception to the six-month rule provided by 3208.3 is for a sudden and extraordinary employment condition. The court said, “In our view, the 'sudden and extraordinary' language is limited to occurrences such as gas main explosions or workplace violence—the type of events which would naturally be expected to cause psychic disturbances even in a diligent and honest employee.”
The application of this exception to physical-mental claims where the psyche claim was a byproduct of the physical injury was incorrect the court ruled in the Lockheed case and backed up by the Fourth Appellate.
Even if a physical-mental claim is more objectively-verifiable and less likely to be fraudulent the Legislature would have made it clear if it didn’t want the six-month rule to apply to such claims.
The 3208.3 statute, which was enacted in 1989 originally contained language that made an exception for psyche claims that arose out of a physical injury, but in 1993 the Legislature deleted the provision.
The court concluded by annulling the Board’s original ruling and remanded the case back to the Board with directions to issue a new and different order in the case consistent with its opinion.
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